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Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the Department of Defense Supply Chain**

1. Flow chart for Raytheon Company FLIR supply chain.
2. Image of FLIR on SH-60B Helicopter.
3. August 1, 2011 letter from Technology Conservation Group to Senate Armed Services Committee informing the Committee that suspect counterfeit parts were sold to Texas Spectrum Electronics.
4. August 23, 2011 letter from Raytheon Company to Senate Armed Services Committee informing the Committee that suspect counterfeit parts were integrated in Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) systems sold to the U.S. Navy.
5. September 8, 2011 letter from Raytheon Company to the U.S. Navy informing the U.S. Navy that suspect counterfeit parts were integrated in FLIRs sold to the U.S. Navy.
6. September 27, 2011 letter from the U.S. Navy to Raytheon Company requesting removal of the affected sub-systems.
7. September 30, 2011 letter from Raytheon Company to the U.S. Navy confirming the affected sub-system.
8. August 22, 2011 email from Fairchild Semiconductor to Raytheon Company concluding that the origin of the parts are questionable.
9. October 20, 2011 Senate Armed Service Committee Letter to Fairchild Semiconductor and October 25, 2011 Response Letter from Fairchild Semiconductor to Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the authenticity and reliability of the suspect counterfeit parts.
10. Flow chart for L-3 Communications display unit supply chain.
11. Image of Color Multipurpose Display Units (CMDU) in C-27Js and C-130Js.
12. October 31, 2011 letter from the Senate Armed Services Committee to the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force regarding counterfeit parts sold to the U.S. Air Force for the C-27J and C-130J.
13. February 2, 2010 letter from L-3 Display Systems informing Alenia Aeronautica of the first counterfeit part (Lattice components) supplied by Hong Dark.
14. L-3 Display Systems Counterfeit Parts History Card on the Lattice part (posted on the L-3 Intranet).

15. December 16, 2010 letter from L-3 Display Systems informing Alenia North America of the second counterfeit part (Samsung memory chip) supplied by Hong Dark.
16. November 9, 2010 testing report of the Samsung memory chip that failed on a fielded aircraft.
17. December 20, 2010 report on the Samsung memory chip, filed by L-3 Displays in the industry-accessible Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) database.
18. L-3 Display Systems Counterfeit Parts History Card on the Samsung memory chip (posted on the L-3 intranet).
19. September 16, 2011 document detailing Internal Corrective Actions taken by L-3 Displays in response to the counterfeit Samsung memory chip.
20. September 19, 2011 letter from L-3 Integrated Systems to the U.S. Air Force providing notice of suspect parts on the C-27J aircraft.
21. November 10, 2010 email from Paul Meyers of Global IC Trading Group to L-3 Communications disclosing that Hong Dark Electronic Trading of China was the supplier of both the Lattice and Samsung counterfeit parts.
22. June 24, 2011 letter from Global IC Trading Group to Senate Armed Services Committee listing electronic parts that Global IC sold to customers from suppliers who had previously provided them with suspect counterfeit parts.
23. October 20, 2011 letter from Senate Armed Services Committee to Samsung Semiconductor Inc. and November 7, 2011 response Letter from Samsung Semiconductor to Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the authenticity and reliability of the suspect counterfeit parts.
24. Flow chart for The Boeing Company ice detection module supply chain.
25. January 12, 2010 BAE Systems Supplier Corrective Action Request issued to Tandex Test Labs relating to counterfeit chips purchased from Tandex.
26. January 7, 2010 BAE Systems Notification of Escape issued to The Boeing Company relating to the suspect counterfeit chips on ice detection module.
27. Undated Boeing SDR Closure Template relating to Boeing assessment that suspect counterfeit chips on ice detection module may have lower reliability.
28. August 17, 2011 The Boeing Company message alerting the Navy to the presence of suspect counterfeit part on P-8 aircraft.

29. October 31, 2011 letter from Department of the U.S. Navy to The Boeing Company regarding Boeing's obligation to report counterfeit parts.
30. October 20, 2011 letter from Senate Armed Services Committee to Xilinx, Inc. and October 26, 2011 response letter from Xilinx, Inc. to Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the authenticity and reliability of the suspect counterfeit parts.
31. December 23, 2010 Boeing document describing suspect counterfeit chips in Distance Measuring Equipment (DME).